Vision Not Troops Needed to Heal Afghanistan

by Paul Schroeder

The Obama Administration is currently deciding whether to send additional American troops to Afghanistan – up to 45,000 more – or scale back our goals there.

The debate pits the U.S. military against civilian advocates for a different strategy or a different set of goals.

While the debate continues, there is a decided lack of an overall strategy for the South Asia region.  We continue to put out fires without addressing the larger slow-burn that gives rise to the fires.  Ali Almad Jalali, of the National Defense University in Washington, D. C. said: “the process (toward ending the conflict) has been void of strategic vision clarity of parameters and unity of effort.  Rhetoric has been more prominent than substance.”

Any person of conscience has to ask some basic questions:  Are we missing opportunities to still the slow-burn?  By pushing (an as yet undefined) victory, are we  seeing the Taliban as a monolithic movement instead of diffuse groups of people fighting for different reasons?  If we send more troops, will they too become sitting ducks?

A glance at a map of Afghanistan points to a volatile area. Iran, Russia, and China, not to mention Pakistan and India, all come together in South Asia. If Iran, Russia, and China all fear being surrounded by what they perceive as hostile troops (historically each does), Pakistan is doubly so if you add India to the mix.

Other ingredients making South Asia volatile include heightened tensions between Pakistan and India over the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, continued killing of Pakistani civilians during U.S. military operations, a Pakistani government unable to come to terms with its own military and intelligence services let alone control its own border, and an increasingly corrupt Afghan government unable to deliver basic goods to its citizens or hold an honest election.

Clearly, a broader vision is required to reduce the tensions in South Asia. Relying only on additional U.S. troops is not prudent.

There should be two basic goals in Afghanistan. First, prevent the use of Afghanistan for training terrorists and mounting terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. This is certainly an immediate and mid-term goal and should be pursued.

Second, rather than creating a democracy that would take decades to build, the United States should work to provide stability in South Asia, especially considering that Pakistan and India are both nuclear-power states and that Iran is marching toward that same status. Regional stability is essential to solving local conflicts that cross borders.
 

So what should be done?

It is clear that a military victory is not possible.  The primary American goal is to prevent Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base of operations.  If so, we should be focused on Al Qaeda, not the Taliban. 

So the first step should be recognizing that The Taliban is not a single entity.  Elizabeth Rubin wrote in the New York Times on September 1 that “the Taliban is a catch-word for different groups who are fighting the coalition and the government for many reasons. Every pocket of resistance throughout the country has originated with a local dispute.”

Mark Magnier, writing in the Los Angeles Times on October 1, urged the U.S. to take advice from the Afghans themselves: “Instead of trying to impose your own ideas on a tribal society, invite the Taliban to the negotiating table. Use traditional governing structures rather than reinventing the wheel. And spend a lot more money on plowshares than on swords.”

The United States made a tragic mistake after World War II by seeing Communism as a single, monolithic force bent on taking over the world.  It was anything but that, and we missed opportunities to negotiate solutions to conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.  The cost was a lot of money and death.

Recognizing theTaliban for what it is, we should encourage negotiations between the Karzai Government in Afghanistan and the moderate elements of the Taliban willing to talk settlement. 

Under the right circumstances, moderate groups within The Taliban might be persuaded to honor the Afghanistan constitution that does away with most of the strict Islamic restrictions used during the 1990s. This presents an opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to explore what it would take to cease the insurgency, or at a minimum, to split its disparate parts.  In short, divide to conquer. 

The key is to identify the appropriate moderate groups and to gradually expand a cessation of conflict to portions of Afghanistan controlled by fundamentalist groups.

The second step involves easing the fears of seven countries with interests in South Asia. Currently, there is no political framework in which such fears can be mutually understood and alleviated.

Such a framework could be established through an on-going United Nations’ sponsored Seven-Party Talks similar to the Six-Party Talks that have eased tension in the Korean Peninsula. The seven parties are the United States, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran.

For each country, fear abounds.

The United States sees the potential of Afghanistan becoming a staging ground for terrorists envisioning a new attack on the scale of 9/11.

Afghanistan sees itself being taken over by foreign troops, a brew that historically forced the country’s many tribes to continue fighting.

China fears American and NATO troops seeking a permanent presence in South Asia. As well, China has made considerable investments in South Asia. At stake is a $3.5 billion investment in a cooper mine at Aynak , expansion of the Karakoram Highway linking China with northern Pakistan, construction of access roads in Afghanistan, a north-south energy and trade corridor that envisions oil and gas pipelines running to China’s Xinjiang Province, and up to a reported $13 billion investment in construction and operation of a deep-water port at Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea.

Russia’s main fear is that the United States and NATO plan a permanent military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Talks could provide mechanisms whereby Russia’s legitimate trade and investments in the region would be protected. If necessary, the Seven-Party Talks could ease Russian fears further through cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an inter-governmental security forum founded in 2001 that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

India is concerned about instability in the region and, after the Mumbai attacks, any resurgence of Islamic terrorism.

Iran fears that any American and NATO military presence in Afghanistan would be used to force regime change in Iran.

Pakistan worries greatly about a perceived U.S.-India-Afghan alliance bent on dismembering Pakistan. It is especially suspicious of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement that allows trade of nuclear fuel for peaceful use.

On-going and regular talks would provide a political mechanism that is currently lacking in the region for a host of problems, including bilateral relations. For example, the United States has pledged $750 million for Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. At present, no mechanism exists for delivery of this aid.

The Seven-Party Talks could also provide a mechanism easing tensions between Pakistan and India. As well, they could lead to improved relations between all the parties and Iran, including resolution of Iran’s nuclear arms ambitions.

Some might argue the United States should not negotiate with Iran until it gives up its nuclear weapons ambitions. This was not the case with North Korea: The Six Party Talks concerning its nuclear program continue with full participation of the United States and North Korea.

Seven Party Talks in South Asia would be an ambitious undertaking, but it is a change we can believe in. Military action alone is unworkable. What can work is a road map for ongoing dialog that serves to reduce fears and anxieties among different countries and people. Only with such a real change in our foreign policy can real progress be made.

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