Families of the Fallen
for Change
Proposal Summary
In December 2005, Families of the Fallen for Change put forward a four-part plan that lies right in the middle of these two extremes. Click here for the complete proposal. Continue reading for a summary.
Our proposal has specific standards – benchmarks if you will -- that can be quantified, measured, and assessed, something all other plans lack.
First, after announcing its intent to withdraw and disavowing permanent bases in Iraq, the U.S., through either the UN or the League of Arab States, would negotiate with all Iraqi parties, including insurgents, except Al Qaeda.
Second, parties would negotiate a floating timetable for withdrawal by percentages.
Negotiations would include the starting dates for the first and subsequent withdrawals as well as the percentage to be withdrawn in each stage.
Third, in exchange for this, the Iraqis would agree to an equal percentage reduction in violence that leads to injury or death of Coalition forces and Iraqi civilians.
Once the first withdrawal is begun, Iraqis have 30 days in which to reduce the violence by the agreed-upon percentage.
If they comply, the second stage of withdrawal and violence reduction would begin.
If they do not comply, the next withdrawal would not begin until they do so.
Once violence drops to 15 percent of the agreed upon starting level,
all coalition troops would leave Iraq. The remaining 15% is allowed for violence sponsored by Al Qaeda
Fourth, American financial aid would be available only if the Iraqi government demonstrates the sharing of (1) power in the government, (2) control of the Ministry of Security, and (3) proceeds of oil revenue.
This proposal is no date certain, but it isn’t staying the course either.
The plan does two things:
1. It gives Iraq time to restore essential services and create new jobs. This gives Iraqis a stake in the future and reduces the conditions that lead the desperate to jihad.
2. It sets in motion Coalition withdrawal from Iraq and gets us way beyond the vague “staying the course” we now have.
Seven days after Congressional decisions to stay the course this in June 2006, 11 Iraqi insurgent groups agreed to cease all attacks immediately if the U.S. would set a two-year timetable for leaving. Not six months, not 12 months, but two years!
The Bush Administration rejected this.
This offer is evidence that the opportunity existed: conditions for some kind of negotiated withdrawal were available.